Capital Mispricing and Structural Risk
The specific roles whose authority is diminished when structural clarity replaces coordination: programme directors, central data teams, product managers of portfolio labels, and the consulting ecosystem. Their resistance is not cynical but rational; these roles were legitimate responses to a real structural problem.
The dysfunction has measurable costs. It also has beneficiaries who profit from its continuation.
Between diagnosis and correction, there is resistance. It is predictable, rational, and the single most common reason structural corrections fail. Naming it is a precondition for surviving it.
The roles that lose scope were not mistakes but rational responses to a real problem: the organisation rewarded the visible coordination of complexity rather than its elimination, because complexity itself was invisible to the people who controlled headcount. The structure that created these roles has changed; the roles have not.
Programme directors and portfolio leads. Their authority derives from coordinating across teams that do not share ownership. When units own processes and interact through contracts, that coordination disappears. The work was real; the need for it is not.
Central data teams. Their authority derives from controlling a shared substrate. When units own their data and publish through contracts, the central team's scope shrinks to reporting-layer governance: contract compatibility, cross-unit standards, conflict resolution. For a team that built its identity around controlling the organisation's data, a smaller, more focused function is experienced as a loss.
Product managers of portfolio labels. Their role bridges a portfolio label and the system. When the label corresponds to an owned process, the bridge is unnecessary, and the role either becomes the process owner or disappears.
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